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Abstract 
Do people care about the degree of centralization? This paper examines the effects of local 
centralization reforms on individuals' well-being using a quasi-natural experiment in Switzerland. The 
results reveal that centralization has a causal negative impact on individuals' life satisfaction. Consistent 
with the concept of procedural utility, centralization reduces individuals' feeling of having political 
influence and interest in politics. In contrast, there are no impacts on individuals' satisfaction with local 
governments' performance. These findings shed new light on what people value in decentralized 
institutions. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Decentralization, life satisfaction, public spending, procedural utility 
JEL codes: H11; H40; I31 
 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Wellbeing Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
 
I am grateful to Esteban Aucejo, Clement Bosquet, Abel Brodeur, Andrew Clark, Adrian Chadi, 
Sergei Guriev, Steve Pischke, Nattavudh Powdthavee, Eugenio Proto and Claudia Senik for advice 
and valuable comments. 
 Sarah Flèche is a Research Officer at the Centre for Economic Performance, London School 
of Economics and Political Science.  
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
 
 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
 
 
 
 S. Flèche, submitted 2015. 
Over the last three decades, many governments, officials, multilateral agencies, non-
governmental organizations, and academics have promoted decentralization, that is, the
transfer of authority and responsibility to local levels of government. For example, the
World Bank has run programs in support of decentralization in 74 countries (e.g., coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Philip-
pines, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, Mexico). The recent cases of
Scotland and Catalonia seeking greater independence have further raised the importance
of local autonomy in the public debate.
However, research to date has not reached a consensus on the tradeoff between cen-
tralized and decentralized systems. Decentralization may increase government officials’
sensitivity to local conditions and needs (Tiebout 1956, Oates 1972). It may help to cut
complex bureaucratic procedures (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). It may also provide
better opportunities for participation by local residents in decision making (Besley and
Coate 2003, Lockwood 2007). In addition, it may lead to more creative, innovative, and
responsive programs by allowing local experimentation (Besley and Case 1995, Besley and
Smart 2007). However, decentralization may also result in the loss of economies of scale
and allow functions to be captured by local elites (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000). This
implies that the overall effects of decentralization on individuals’ well-being are difficult
to predict depending on the relative strengths of these and other channels.
Most of the empirical literature on decentralization has focused on evaluations based
on the performance of decentralized governments. Studies show that decentralization
leads to greater economic efficiency (Davoodi and Zou 1998, Iimi 2005, Rodriguez-Pose
and Ezcurra 2011), lower poverty and inequality (Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011),
greater efficiency of education services (Barankay and Lockwood 2007) and social services
(Faguet 2004), and lower corruption (Fisman and Gatti 2001). The focus on local govern-
ment performance is because this is often the best available measure of decentralization
outcomes. However, the research on self-determination and local participation indicates
that decentralization may affect people’s well-being through additional channels than lo-
cal government performance. For example, decentralization may increase the feeling of
having a say in daily politics and policy or the feeling of being part of a local community.
Therefore the focus on local government performance may fail to capture the overall ef-
fects of decentralization. Accordingly, it is important that comprehensive evaluations of
decentralization account for its effects on individuals’ well-being per se and not only on
the performance of local governments.
To examine this issue, this paper tests whether centralization reforms, that is, the
transfer of authority and responsibility from local to more centralized levels of govern-
ment, have a causal effect on individuals’ well-being (measured by life satisfaction). It
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also investigates what individuals value in centralization versus decentralization and what
are the critical factors of decentralization for individuals’ well-being. Finally, it tests
whether centralization reforms have long-run effects on well-being and assesses the extent
to which individuals’ preferences adapt to different local systems. This paper presents
the first analysis of causal effects of centralization reforms on individual well-being and
is the first to investigate whether centralization effects on well-being persist over time,
that is, whether they are long-run effects that may be undetected by local government
performance alone.
Previous research on decentralization and subjective well-being has major drawbacks.
All the studies are based on cross-sectional comparisons: Frey and Stutzer (2000) run
cross-cantonal regressions using Swiss data, and Bjornskov et al. (2008) and Voigt and
Blume (2012) rely on cross-country data. Diaz-Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose (2012) repli-
cate a similar analysis using European data. Two studies explore the relationship between
decentralization and life satisfaction in developing countries: Gao et al. (2014) and Su-
jarwoto and Tampubolon (2015). To the best of the author’s knowledge, only one study,
Sujarwoto and Tampubolon (2015), investigates the effects of decentralization reforms on
citizen happiness in Indonesia by conducting a multilevel analysis. All of the studies find
that fiscal and political decentralization are positively correlated with life satisfaction.
The important difficulty with these cross-section analyses is that the effect of decentral-
ization is likely to be contaminated by omitted variables, for example, culture, political
preferences, and overall institutional settings, that are correlated with both the degree of
decentralization and individuals’ subjective well-being.
In this paper, I take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment that has transferred
political, financial, and administrative responsibilities in Switzerland from municipalities
to cantons between 2000 and 2012.1 On average these cantonal reforms have reduced
municipal autonomy and have increased centralization at the canton level. This frame-
work is particularly attractive for three reasons. First, the decrease in local autonomy has
followed efforts to improve the effectiveness and transparency of public action through
national incentives (e.g., “New Public Management Reforms” and the “New Fiscal Equal-
ization Reform”). The timing of the reforms across all cantons is geographically dispersed
in a quasi-random fashion. Hence comparison of individuals’ well-being before and after
the reforms in cantons that implemented the reforms (treated group) and in cantons that
did not or that did it later (control group) provides a simple method for evaluating the
causal effect of centralization. Second, the cantonal reforms framework has transferred
responsibilities in a broad range of domains such as health, education, social affairs,
1Canton is a type of administrative division. Cantons roughly correspond to “regions” or
“semisovereign states” when compared with other administrative divisions. They are larger than mu-
nicipalities in terms of area and population. There are 26 cantons in Switzerland.
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transport, and public administration. Third, although Switzerland is one of the most
decentralized countries in the world, it has some external validity because centralization
reforms of this type have been carried out in other European countries.2
I match this institutional setting with individual panel data, the Swiss Household
Panel (SHP), which provides information on a full range of socioeconomic outcomes and
individual life satisfaction under the period of investigation. These data have several
advantages. They report both the canton and the municipality of residence. In addition,
because the same individuals are observed over several years, it enables testing for endoge-
nous residential sorting, namely, the possibility that individuals would move to cantons
where political decisions are in accordance with their preferences. It also provides a rich
set of individual characteristics that can be controlled for to minimize this potential bias.
Moreover, the SHP enables the dynamic effects of centralization reforms on individual
life satisfaction to be tracked over time. In contrast, previous studies have looked only at
average estimates. It is possible that the effect on individual well-being varies according
to implementation costs or economies of scale when adopting the reforms. Accordingly,
the overall effect could increase or decrease over time. Finally, these SHP data include
information on different domains of satisfaction (e.g., satisfaction with public expenses,
democracy, political influence, health, and financial situation). Decomposing the effects
of centralization reforms among different domains and comparing different population
subgroups allows us to identify the aspects of centralization that are critical factors of
individual well-being and sheds new light on the tradeoff between centralized and decen-
tralized governments.
To preview my findings, I find that the degree of centralization matters for individual
well-being. That is, after controlling for a range of individual and local characteristics,
individuals exposed to a centralization reform experience a small decrease in life satis-
faction, equivalent to 3 percent of a standard deviation. Although the effect is small, it
is statistically significant, robust to many specification checks, and consistent with the
findings of previous studies.
A degree of caution must be exercised in estimating centralization effects on subjec-
tive well-being, because biases related to measurement and endogeneity may critically
influence the results. Related to the latter issue, I show that the results are unlikely to
be driven by endogenous residential sorting. In addition, and perhaps more importantly,
I find no significant anticipation effects in the years prior to the implementation and no
significant spillover effects in the cantons that did not implement the reforms or that did
it later. Finally, respondents living in cantons affected and in cantons not affected by the
2For example, several regional reforms were adopted in 2014–2015 in France (loi de modernisation
de l’action publique territoriale, loi relative a` la de´limitation des re´gions, and loi portant sur la nouvelle
organisation territoriale de la Re´publique).
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reforms evolved sufficiently similarly to make the experiment reliable.
Investigating various potential mechanisms, I find that the impact of the central-
ization reforms on life satisfaction appears to be driven by voters who may have fewer
opportunities to participate in the political process and have the feeling of losing polit-
ical influence. This is consistent with a procedural disutility effect, meaning decreased
satisfaction derived from political participation. In contrast, I do not find evidence of a
decrease in life satisfaction for people in bad health, people with children, or people who
benefit from the social system, who are potentially affected by the reforms. Consistently,
I do not observe decreases in financial satisfaction, satisfaction with health status, and
satisfaction with public expenses. These findings highlight the lack of a negative relation-
ship between the Swiss centralization reforms and satisfaction with the performance of
local governments and the difficulty in evaluating local autonomy policy based solely on
government performance and other standard economic variables. That is not to say such
evaluations are not viable. Here, the economic effects of the reforms may be delayed or
biased downward by preexisting cooperation at the canton level. By using more long-run
data, it is possible to find a stronger effect on government performance. Nevertheless,
there is clearly scope for using subjective well-being data, among other evaluation tools,
to assess individuals’ experience of centralization reforms and to identify well-being effects
that may be undetected by government performance alone.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I. describes the Swiss context
and the centralization reforms. Section II. presents the data and the empirical strategy.
Sections III. and IV. discuss the central results of the paper, robustness checks, and tests
for underlying mechanisms. Section V. concludes.
I. The Swiss Context and the Reforms
A. The Swiss System
There are three administrative levels in Switzerland: the Federation, cantons, and
municipalities. The Federation is divided into 26 sovereign cantons, each of which has
its own constitution and unicameral parliament. The cantons exercise broad authority,
possessing all the powers that are not specifically given to the federal government. The
third administrative level is the municipality, which also has autonomy within the limits
of the federal and cantonal jurisdictions. In 2012 there were 2495 municipalities (Swiss
Federal Statistics),3 but the size and population of municipalities varies enormously, the
smallest having fewer than 100 inhabitants and the largest almost 400000 inhabitants
3www.bfs.admin.ch
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(Zurich). The Federation grants autonomy to each municipality and introduced a new
article in the last Federation Constitution of 18 April 1999 (SR/CH 101, art. 50, para. 1)
that stipulates: “The autonomy of the municipalities shall be guaranteed in accordance
with cantonal law.” The local government and its deciding and acting autonomy are
well recognized within this constitutional article, which moreover justifies the right to
maintain local responsibilities.
This autonomy of the municipalities is feasible for three reasons. First, local govern-
ments can access sufficient resources and can use these resources autonomously. In 2008,
the share of total resources was close to 30 percent for the Federation, 40 percent for
the cantons, and 30 percent for the municipalities, based on local taxes and revenues.
Municipalities thus control almost the same amount of income as the Federation (Swiss
Federal Statistics, 2008). Second, accountability and transparency at the local level are
guaranteed by direct democratic instruments in addition to representative democratic
parliaments and governments. The most important direct democratic instruments in
cantons are the popular initiative to change the canton’s constitution or laws, compul-
sory and optional referenda to prevent new laws, and the changing of existing laws and
optional financial referenda to prevent new state expenditure. Therefore, all citizens par-
ticipate and play an active role in political life at the local level. The third reason that
the autonomy of municipalities is feasible is that there exists a strong legal framework
clearly setting out the powers, rights, and duties of local governments.4
Traditionally, many responsibilities are shared between the Swiss cantons and the local
municipalities, such as education, local police, policy relating to culture, sports, youth,
and the elderly, building and surveillance of local roads, the local public transport system,
health (home care, fighting addiction, health promotion), public welfare, and the environ-
ment (waste management and water treatment). The assessment of public expenditure
(federal, cantonal, municipal), according to functions, reveals that municipalities have the
highest share in the budget areas of environment (63 percent) and culture, sports, and
recreation (62 percent). The cantons are more heavily represented in public order (47
percent), health (83 percent), education (58 percent), and administration (41 percent).
The Federation has an exclusive position in foreign affairs (100 percent), a dominant po-
sition in defense (90 percent), and assumes half of the public expenditure related to the
economy (44 percent) (Swiss Federal Statistics, 2011).
However, because of the right of the cantons to organize themselves independently,
4Consequently, many Swiss people identify first and foremost with their local government and not
with Switzerland. In the rural areas, the villages come first. At the municipal level, this identification
with the local level finds its expression in the fact that many administrative tasks are not carried out by
professional staff but by ordinary people who devote between a few hours per month and up to several
days per week to specific tasks.
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there is considerable variation in cantonal and municipal government structures with
regard to the division of competences between cantons and municipalities (“the extent of
municipal autonomy”). In Zurich, for example, municipalities are the bearer of complete
residual power, meaning that “political communes are responsible for all those public
affairs for which neither the Confederation nor the canton is responsible.”5 In Glarus, the
residual power is confined to “local affairs,”6 while municipalities in Fribourg have only
those functions that are delegated to it by a legal act.7
B. The Centralization Reforms
Between 2000 and 2012, 19 out of the 26 Swiss cantons launched reforms to change the
distribution of tasks and responsibilities between cantons and municipalities. With these
cantonal reforms of task allocation, fewer policy-making and implementation responsibil-
ities have been transferred to municipalities. A first analysis of the reforms clearly shows
a centralization movement. This may be explained by the considerable decentralization
in Switzerland that, as opposed to other centralized countries, requires centralization for
service provision to be homogenized.
There are a number of reasons behind these reforms. First, the purpose of the reforms
was to increase cantonal responsibilities and restrain public spending. Cantons face large
variations across municipalities in terms of financial and administrative capacity. Specif-
ically, municipalities in large cantons such as Vaud, Lucerne, Aargau, and Bern have
difficulties in dealing with tasks delegated to them and need financial support. These re-
forms therefore aimed to help municipalities deal with economic pressures and improved
the transparency of local public finance (Jacot-Descombes 2013). Second, these reforms
followed the introduction of “New Public Management Reforms,” which improved the
efficiency of public action, and the introduction in 2008 of the “New Fiscal Equalization
Reform,” which changed the distribution of tasks and responsibilities between the Feder-
ation and cantons. Consequently, cantons were required to reform their own legislation
to anticipate or adapt to these national reforms.
Each canton has reformed at least one significant area—in financial terms—regarding
schools (usually in primary and secondary schools), health (particularly hospitals), and
social affairs (usually either social assistance and/or social insurance). Appendix Tables
A.1 -A.5 provide a detailed description of selected reforms. Transfers have occurred at
the decision, financial, and implementation levels. In terms of implementation, social
insurance is still shared between cantons and municipalities, because municipalities act
5Article 83 KV Zurich.
6Article 119 KV Glarus.
7Article 133 KV Fribourg.
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as good local relays to deliver benefits.
Education is clearly the area where most of the tasks have been transferred. This
was a policy domain that remained highly decentralized. These reforms have unified
school organization between cantons. For example, in the cantons of Bern and Vaud,
responsibilities of secondary schools have been entirely transferred to the canton level. In
Vaud, this is also the case for primary schools. The areas that have also been the most
often affected are health and social services. In health, a strategy of “cantonalization”
clearly appears in hospital systems (cantons of Neuchaˆtel, Jura, and Bern). Aargau,
Graubu¨nden and Schwyz are the only cantons where the hospital system is not entirely
centralized. Vaud also centralized its ambulance and emergency systems. Finally, the field
of social and social insurance has been relatively centralized by the reforms, in particular
with respect to standards governing social assistance and public support services, as well
as tasks related to federal legislation regulating social security, including unemployment
(Aargau, Bern), health insurance (Aargau, Bern), and additional services (Aargau and
Neuchaˆtel). These three policies (schools, health, and social services) are areas where the
cantons and municipalities allocate more financial resources, giving significant weights to
all these transfers.
The reforms were not adopted at the same time across cantons. Cantons had large
incentives to modify their own legislation and implement the reforms, but were given the
liberty to decide the exact timing themselves. In particular, municipalities were heavily
involved and consulted during the process of implementing the reforms. Thus the final
timing of the reforms across cantons was partly determined by a legislative process. The
majority of the reforms were implemented in 19 cantons between 2000 and 2012. There
may have been some reforms in the 7 remaining cantons, but by 2012 they were limited
or not yet implemented. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the timing of the
reforms. The spread of the reforms was not concentrated in certain parts of Switzerland,
and early-, middle-, and late-reforming cantons are present in all parts of the country.
C. Were the Cantonal Differences in the Timing of the Central-
ization Reforms Random?
For the identification strategy, the timing of the reforms does not need to be inde-
pendent of fixed cantonal characteristics, because I will control for canton fixed effects.
However, it is informative to investigate what cantonal characteristics, if any, would pre-
dict the timing of the reforms across cantons.
I here look at the relationship between the timing of the reforms and cantonal charac-
teristics such as income per capita, public spending, degree of decentralization, degree of
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Figure 1: Timing of the Reforms across Swiss Cantons
Source: Ruhli (2012) “Autonomie communale entre illusion et re´alite´. Monitoring des cantons 4: Structures communales
et politique structurelle communale des cantons”
direct democracy, language, religion, and sociodemographic characteristics. I use admin-
istrative data from the Federal Population Census8 and the Base de donne´es des cantons
et des villes suisses (BADAC).9 Every 10 years, the Federal Population Census is realized
and shows the demographic, spatial, social, and economic developments of Switzerland.
The BADAC collects hundreds of data items from a variety of sources such as the Swiss
Official Statistics, the Department of Finance, and the IDHEAP survey10 at the canton
and municipality levels. Appendices C.1. and C.2. provide a definition of the canton-level
variables used in the analysis from these sources. The index of direct democracy is from
Stutzer (1999). It is an unweighted average of four indices that evaluate the power of
the different direct democratic institutions. These include the constitutional initiative,
the statutory initiative, the fiscal referendum, and the statutory referendum. The index
takes values from 1 to 6, where 6 indicates the highest degree of direct democracy. The
exact construction of the index is explained in Appendix C.3..
Table 1 reports the results of two canton-level regressions without and with region
dummies. The dependent variable is the year of the reform in each canton, and the ex-
planatory variables are those listed above in years 1970; 1980; and 1990–2000 (pre-reform
period). I find no significant relationship between the timing of the reforms and cantonal
8www.bfs.admin.ch
9www.badac.ch/fr/index.php
10The Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (French: Institut des hautes e´tudes en admin-
istration publique)
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characteristics such as income per capita, public spending, and degree of decentraliza-
tion. Apart from region dummies, none of the explanatory variables are statistically
significant.11
Table 1: Exogeneity of the Centralization Reforms (Canton Level)
Year of reform
without region with region
dummies dummies
Ln cantonal income per capita -0.542 (3.170) 1.198 (2.877)
Ln cantonal population -0.495 (3.846) -3.113 (3.431)
Ln cantonal public spending 0.195 (3.183) 1.382 (2.910)
Degree of decentralization -0.0308 (0.0834) -0.009 (0.074)
Direct democracy -0.112 (0.757) 0.146 (0.681)
Age 15-30 9.620 (58.78) 11.52 (52.75)
Age 30-45 23.51 (39.20) 21.22 (33.32)
Age 45-65 2.079 (34.60) 2.587 (31.18)
Age 65 + 15.08 (26.26) 8.720 (23.75)
% women 3.159 (54.32) 6.730 (49.80)
% married -7.421 (34.54) -2.254 (30.99)
% foreigner 4.398 (17.30) -0.368 (15.26)
% Christian 6.074 (52.27) 3.040 (47.20)
% Muslim 11.22 (65.66) 5.077 (59.84)
% Jewish -32.36 (305.8) 10.19 (282.9)
% no religion 3.156 (49.82) 3.939 (44.82)
% French 1.489 (13.10) 0.0870 (11.64)
% German 2.421 (13.16) 0.947 (11.64)
% Italian 3.880 (13.03) 0.958 (11.64)
% employed 4.656 (28.15) 5.889 (25.22)
% unemployed -8.790 (160.8) -19.45 (144.6)
% primary education -11.56 (56.43) -11.83 (51.66)
% secondary education -13.94 (60.24) -15.42 (54.99)
% tertiary education 4.427 (22.73) 7.529 (20.01)
Region dummies No Yes
Observations 247 247
Notes: All explanatory variables are from the Federal Population Cen-
sus or the Base des Donnees des Cantons et Villes Suisses (BADAC).
Years: 1970; 1980; 1990-2000. When values are missing, I use multiple
imputation.
Table 2 shows the degree of local decentralization at the canton level before and after
the reforms. The share of municipal expenditure in the total amount of cantonal expendi-
ture shifts downward by 4 percentage points in cantons that implemented a centralization
reform (with a maximum of 10 percentage points in Neuchaˆtel and Bern).
Table 2: Impact of the Reforms on the Degree of Local Decentralization
Before Reform After Reform Change (S.E.)
Degree of local decentralisation 48.71 (1.09) 44.68 (1.47) - 4.03*** (1.85)
Notes: Based on 19 cantons from 1997 to 2007. Data are from the Base de Donne´es des
Cantons et Villes Suisses (BADAC). In parentheses, standard deviations in columns 1
and 2 and standard errors in column 3. The degree of local decentralization is measured
by the share of municipal expenditure in the total amount of cantonal expenditure.
11Running the same regressions but using a shorter time period (1990-2000) provides similar findings.
I also test alternative specifications using hazards models. The same results are obtained.
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The impact of the reforms on the degree of local decentralization can also be seen in
Figure 2, which shows the deviation from mean degree of local decentralization before
and after the reforms. The average degree of local decentralization after implementation
of the reforms decreases by approximately 6 percentage points, when comparing only a
year before the reforms and a year after adoption. This provides descriptive evidence
of significant effects of the reforms on the degree of local decentralization at the time of
implementation.
Figure 2: The Impact of the Reforms on the Degree of Local Decentralization
Notes: Based on 19 cantons and a model where the degree of local decentralization is predicted with canton effects as well
as year dummies, which correspond to years from the implementation of the reforms. The effects of these dummies are
plotted on the figure.
II. Data and Empirical Strategy
A. Data
To evaluate the effect of these centralization reforms on Swiss individual well-being,
the empirical analysis appeals to the SHP. In 1999 the Swiss Foundation for Research in
Social Sciences established the SHP, which is a yearly panel study following a random
sample of households in Switzerland over time by interviewing all household members.
Households are randomly selected from the telephone directory and are followed up by
means of computer-assisted telephone interviews. The sample contains about 15, 000
respondents, 14–97 years of age, observed on average 6 times and for a total of 85, 000
observations. The period covered by the data is 1999–2012.
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There are several advantages in using the SHP. First, it constitutes a unique database
for Switzerland because it covers the 26 Swiss cantons. The samples are stratified by
major region (Lake Geneva region, Mittelland, north-west Switzerland, Zurich, eastern
Switzerland, central Switzerland, and Ticino), without any regional oversampling. Ap-
pendix Table A.6 shows some descriptive statistics for the 26 cantons. Second, these are
panel data collected on a consistent basis over cantons, municipalities, individuals, and
years. Therefore, this allows me to analyze within-person changes in well-being over time
and to control for a broad range of individual characteristics (e.g., gender, age, marital
status, employment status, health status, income, citizenship, and political preferences).
The data also identify municipalities of residence. On average there are 279 observations
per municipality and 5, 290 per canton (Appendix Table A.6).
In the SHP, subjective well-being is assessed through the following question: “In gen-
eral, how satisfied are you with your life?” where respondents have 11 choices (0=not all
satisfied, 10=very satisfied). The life satisfaction question is asked only over the period
2000–2012. Table 3 shows means and standard deviations of the variables from the SHP
and the distribution of life satisfaction. The table shows that 15.66 percent of the respon-
dents reported that they were very satisfied with their life [10]. Conversely, 1.86 percent
answered that they were dissatisfied [0–4]. To investigate the possible mechanisms of
centralization, I also use other measures of subjective well-being, such as “satisfaction
with public expenses” (0–1), “feeling about political influence” (0–10), “satisfaction with
health”(0–10), “satisfaction with financial situation”(0–10) and“satisfaction with democ-
racy” (0–10). Appendix C.4. gives the exact wording and possible answers for each of
these variables. Responses show that 36.5 percent of the respondents are satisfied with
public expenses, 19.13 percent felt they have no political influence at all [0], whereas 15.91
percent felt they have a very strong political influence [7–10]. In addition, 20.08 percent
of the respondents answered that they are completely satisfied with their health status,
16.62 percent are completely satisfied with the financial situation of their household, and
23.48 percent are very satisfied with the way in which democracy works in Switzerland
[8–10].
The validity of such subjective data may be a concern. Many issues remain unre-
solved regarding self-reported measures of well-being (Benjamin et al. 2012, Deaton and
Stone 2013, Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball and Szembrot 2014, Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball
and Rees-Jones 2014). However, there is substantial evidence that these measures are
capable of capturing accurate and meaningful information (see, among others, Easter-
lin (1974), Diener et al. (1985), Clark and Oswald (1994), Easterlin (1995), Clark and
Oswald (1996), Diener et al. (1999), Di Tella et al. (2001), Easterlin (2001), Frey and
Stutzer (2002), Di Tella et al. (2003), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Layard (2005),
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Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), Clark and Senik (2010)). A brief analysis also pro-
vides evidence that measures of subjective well-being from the SHP perform in the way
the theory would suggest with respect to the construct being measured. For example,
“life satisfaction,” “satisfaction with health,” and “satisfaction with financial situation”
are shaped by sociodemographic factors such as age, income, health, and employment
status. Conversely, “feeling about political influence” and “satisfaction with democracy”
are associated with citizenship and political preferences (Appendix Table A.7). Moreover,
there is evidence that respondents find these questions on subjective well-being easy to
understand. They have very low nonresponse rates (less than 5 percent did not answer or
selected “do not know”). Finally, consistent with previous analysis, I find clear regional
patterns of life satisfaction (Dorn et al. 2007). For example, life satisfaction is higher in
the German-speaking cantons than in the French- or Italian-speaking cantons. Although
it is not an issue in this paper, given that I analyze within-canton within-person changes
in subjective well-being, one possible explanation is that cantonal language is related to
cultural patterns, which in turn influence self-reported life satisfaction.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics. 2000-2012. Swiss Household Panel
. Obs Mean SD Min Max
Outcomes
Life satisfaction 84,218 8.023 1.436 0 10
[0 − 4] 1.86 %
[5 − 6] 8.93 %
[7] 16.02 %
[8] 38.83 %
[9] 18.71 %
[10] 15.66 %
Satisfaction with public expenses 65,079 0.365 0.481 0 1
Feeling about political influence 68,094 3.756 2.609 0 10
Satisfaction with health 84,169 7.953 1.748 0 10
Satisfaction with financial situation 84,003 7.382 1.960 0 10
Satisfaction with democracy 67,676 6.093 1.912 0 10
Individual characteristics
Female 84,218 0.550 0.498 0 1
Age 84,218 45.186 18.037 14 97
Married 84,218 0.551 0.497 0 1
Divorced 84,218 0.079 0.270 0 1
Single 84,218 0.309 0.462 0 1
Widowed 84,218 0.046 0.210 0 1
Separated 84,218 0.014 0.119 0 1
Foreigner 84,200 0.081 0.273 0 1
Bad health 84,218 0.147 0.354 0 1
Employed 84,218 0.584 0.493 0 1
Unemployed 84,218 0.011 0.104 0 1
Retired 84,218 0.167 0.373 0 1
Student 84,218 0.143 0.350 0 1
Housewife 84,218 0.082 0.275 0 1
French 84,218 0.266 0.442 0 1
German 84,218 0.691 0.462 0 1
Italian 84,218 0.043 0.202 0 1
Left voter 73,068 0.392 0.488 0 1
Yearly total personal income 84,218 10.914 0.677 4 16
Note: Columns 1-5 provide descriptive statistics from the SHP regression sample
(2000-2012).
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B. Empirical Strategy
The effect of the centralization reforms can be obtained by comparing the life satis-
faction of individuals in cantons that implemented a reform (treated group) with the life
satisfaction of individuals in the remaining cantons (control group) before and after the
policy change. The life satisfaction of individual i, living in municipality m, belonging to
canton c, at year t can be defined as:
LSimct = α + βRct +Ximctλ+ Zmctη + ρc + µt + θi + imct (1)
where Rct is a dummy equal to 1 if the centralization reform has been implemented in
canton c at date t, and Ximct is a vector containing additional regressors known to be
predictors of life satisfaction, such as yearly total personal income, age, age squared,
marital status, employment status, and health status. Year and canton fixed effects are
included in the model. These fixed effects completely control for yearly influences and
any fixed differences between cantons, for example, official language, degree of urban-
ization, culture, and political institutions. Therefore the identification strategy relies
on intertemporal variations between cantons when adopting the reforms. In addition,
the panel data enable the inclusion of individual fixed effects that allow me to control
for individual unobservable heterogeneity, including reporting style in answering the life
satisfaction question. Standard errors are clustered at the canton level.12
Note that satisfaction responses are observed on an ordinal scale. A natural estimator
in this case would be an ordered response model, for example, ordered probit. However,
ordered probit are not suitable for panel data analysis. One alternative approach is to use
a linear regression model with fixed effects: Both Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)
and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) point out that the choice of ordered probit or least
squares makes little difference when applied to life satisfaction data. I therefore estimate
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions in the analysis. For robustness, I also check the
results using probit adjusted OLS (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2006).
In applying the difference-in-differences strategy, it is important to consider carefully
the “experiment” created by these centralization reforms. Ideally, these reforms would be
independent random events that varied in timing and had no spillover effects to cantons
that did not implement the reforms. In addition, the strategy requires the assumption
that trends of cantonal characteristics over time are not correlated with the timing of
the reform. Otherwise, I possibly capture only different trends between the control and
treated groups, so that cantons that have implemented the reforms faced specific shocks
different to those in other cantons. To limit this possible bias, I use time-varying municipal
12Clustering at the canton-year level yields similar findings (available upon request).
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and cantonal controls, Zmct, such as cantonal income per capita, cantonal unemployment
rate, and municipality size.13 Because a part of the effect of centralization reforms may
go through local public spending, I do not control for local public spending. In most
specifications, I also include canton-specific time trends in case other time-varying factors
correlated with the implementation of the reforms would explain my results.
Another crucial assumption to hold for the difference-in-differences strategy is that of
a common trend: that life satisfaction evolved similarly in control and treated groups up
to the implementation of the reforms. To test this, I plot the trend in mean life satisfaction
(Figure 3), after controlling for the same set of individual and local characteristics (yearly
total personal income, age, marital status, health, employment status, cantonal income
per capita, cantonal unemployment rate, municipality size, canton dummies, and year
dummies). I consider three trends according to exposure to the reforms (early-, middle-,
late- reforming cantons). The lines track each other well from two years prior and up to
the implementation of the reforms. The means are not statistically different from each
other.14
Figure 3: Life satisfaction Residuals. Common Trend Assumption
Notes: The values plotted are the average residuals by year up to the implementation of the reforms and treated groups
(early, middle, late) from a regression of life satisfaction on yearly total personal income, age, marital status, health,
employment status, cantonal income per capita, cantonal unemployment rate, municipality size, canton dummies and year
dummies.
Finally, I need to verify that the control and treated groups evolved similarly over time.
Appendix Table A.8 shows means of the demographic and socioeconomic variables before
13These variables are from the BADAC data (see Appendix C.2.).
14The p values for F tests of statistical differences are all above 0.10. This is 0.754, 0.825 and 0.905,
respectively.
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and after the reforms, in 2000 and 2012 respectively, and by whether the respondent is in
the treated group (cantons that implemented the reform) or the control group (cantons
that did not implement the reform). The pre–post difference for each group is computed,
and the null hypothesis of no difference in the pre–post differences between the treated
group and control group is tested. The p-values are reported in the final column of
Appendix Table A.8. Of the 22 differences tested, only 1 is significant at a 10 percent
level: municipality size. Municipality size has increased in cantons affected by the reforms,
whereas municipality size has decreased in cantons not affected by the reforms. Overall,
the two groups evolved sufficiently similarly for the difference-in-differences strategy to
perform reasonably well.
III. Empirical Results
A. Effects on Life Satisfaction
Table 4 shows estimates of equation (1) using OLS. The effect of the centralization
reforms on life satisfaction is first estimated in cross-section (column 1), without cantonal
and municipal controls. I progressively add cantonal and municipal controls (column 2).
I then use the panel nature of the data to explore how centralization reforms affect
within-person change in life satisfaction (columns 3 and 4).
Coefficients, in columns 1 and 2, show that the relationship between “centralization
reforms” and life satisfaction is significant at the 5 percent level and negative. This
indicates that people report lower levels of satisfaction after introduction of the reforms.
Adding municipal and cantonal controls such as income per capita, unemployment rate,
and municipality size does affect the coefficient on“centralization reforms,” which remains
statistically significant. All the coefficients on individual and local controls attract signs
that are consistent with those in the literature (for detailed results see Appendix Table
A9). Moving on to include individual fixed effects, the negative relationship between
“centralization reforms”and life satisfaction holds and remains significant at the 5 percent
level.
The size of the estimates (column 4) indicates that people exposed to centralization
saw a decrease in life satisfaction of approximately 3 percent of a standard deviation.15
This is consistent with the findings of Frey and Stutzer (2000) and Bjornskov et al.
(2008).16 At first glance, this estimated effect may seem modest. However, the variation
150.0257 = 0.0383/1.436.
16The cross-section estimates of Frey and Stutzer (2000) and Bjornskov et al. (2008) indicate that an
increase in local autonomy is associated with an increase in life satisfaction of approximately 3 percent
of a standard deviation (marginal effect: 0.033 in Frey and Stutzer (2000); coefficient from weighted
ordered probit: 0.032 in Bjornskov et al. (2008)).
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in the degree of decentralization before and after the reforms is relatively small (see
Table 2). In addition, the size of the effect can be evaluated for comparison with other
predictors of life satisfaction. For example, a 1-point increase in ln yearly total personal
income is associated with an increase in life satisfaction of approximately 4 percent of a
standard deviation. In contrast, the estimated effect of centralization reforms is 13 times
lower than the coefficient of being unemployed (compared with being employed), which
is associated with a decrease in life satisfaction of approximately 39 percent of a standard
deviation (see Appendix Table A.9, column 4).
Table 4: The Causal Effect of Centralization Reforms on Individual Life satisfaction
Life satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cross section Cross section Panel analysis Panel analysis
baseline with controls baseline with controls
Centralization reforms -0.0458** -0.0458** -0.0411** -0.0383**
(0.0204) (0.0194) (0.0170) (0.0169)
Observations 54,761 54,761 84,218 84,218
R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.034 0.034
Nb of individuals 10,842 10,842 14,695 14,695
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal and cantonal controls No Yes No Yes
Individual fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by cantons. Individual controls in columns 1 and 2 include ln income,
age, age squared, gender, marital status, employment status, health status, educational level, religion, first language,
citizenship and political preference. In columns 3 and 4, individual controls include ln income, age, age squared, marital
status, employment status and health status. Municipal controls include municipality size and cantonal controls include
cantonal GDP per capita and the cantonal unemployment rate. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
B. Robustness Checks
The baseline results (Table 4) show a small but significant negative causal impact
of centralization on life satisfaction. It is important to explore further the identification
assumptions beneath these first results. As robustness checks, I run two falsification tests
and estimate two alternative specifications.
First, I consider a placebo experiment by assuming that the centralization reforms were
implemented three years earlier. Column 1 of Table 5 shows the results. Reassuringly,
the coefficient on “centralization reforms” shows that there is no effect on life satisfaction,
indicating that unobservable trends within cantons are not driving the results. I check as
a second falsification test whether the centralization reforms affected the life satisfaction
of respondents in cantons that did not implement the reforms (control group). I do not
find significant spillover effect (column 2 of Table 5).
As the first alternative specification, the equation presented in column 4 of Table 4
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is re-estimated, but each respondent is assigned to the canton in which they lived before
implementation of the reforms (in 2000).17 As such, I can make sure that the results are
not driven by endogenous residential sorting. Column 3 of Table 5 shows the results of the
estimation. The coefficient on “centralization reforms” remains negative and statistically
significant, but is numerically lower than in the baseline (Table 4). Thus, restricting the
sample to people for whom the canton of residence in 2000 is available may result in an
upward bias because some of the people who were most affected by the centralization
reforms are excluded from the sample. Second, I re-estimate the centralization effect
using probit adjusted OLS. The coefficient remains negative and statistically significant
(column 4 of Table 5).
Table 5: Robustness Checks: The Causal Effect of Centralization Reforms on Individual
Life satisfaction
Life satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Three Spillover Endogeneous Probit
years prior effect sorting adjusted OLS
Centralization reforms 0.00555 -11.61 -0.0375* -0.0364*
(0.0258) (7.029) (0.0214) (0.0201)
Observations 84,218 84,218 52,470 84,218
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.028
Nb of individuals 14,695 14,695 7,594 14,695
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal and cantonal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by cantons. Individual controls include ln income, age, age squared,
marital status, employment status and health status. Municipal controls include municipality size and cantonal controls
include cantonal GDP per capita and the cantonal unemployment rate. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
C. Dynamic Analysis
Next, I investigate the effect of the centralization reforms on individuals’ life satis-
faction at yearly intervals before and after the reforms come into effect (Table 6). The
econometric model is now as follows:
LSimct = α+ β1R−1,ct + +β2R0,ct + +β3R1,2,ct +Ximctλ+Zmctη+ ρc +µt + θi + imct (2)
where R−1,ct is an indicator for centralization reforms and set to 1 from one year prior to
17Key results were also estimated when the sample is restricted to cantons that have at least 200
observations for statistical reliability (Appenzell Innerrhoden, Jura, and Uri are dropped). This has
little effect on the estimates.
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coming to effect. R1,2,ct is an indicator for the period one through two years following the
reforms. All estimates include canton and year dummies and the usual set of covariates.
This design allows the short-term impacts to be disentangled from the medium-term
impacts of centralization reforms. It is possible that, because of implementation costs
or economies of scales, the effect of centralization reforms on individuals’ life satisfaction
varies over time. In addition, this specification allows additional placebo tests to be per-
formed to determine whether “fake” dates of reforms predict the change in life satisfaction
as well as the true ones.
Consistent with the common trend assumption (see Section II.), centralization should
not have any effect prior to implementation. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show the esti-
mates of equation (2) without and with local controls, respectively. As expected, people
are not significantly affected by the centralization reforms in the year prior to implemen-
tation. This implies that people did not fully anticipate the effects of the reforms. It also
confirms that the timing of the centralization reforms agree with the timing predicted by
the data and further support the credibility of the identification strategy. In addition,
people are negatively affected afterward, consistent with the baseline findings (Table 4).
The estimates are statistically significant for the year of implementation and for the pe-
riod one through two years after, indicating that people are less satisfied with their life
when the reforms are adopted.
I next experiment with longer lags, up to three years after implementation of the
reforms (column 3 of Table 6). Interestingly, the estimate for the period after three
years following the reforms is smaller and not significant. To ensure that these results
are not driven by individuals who are in the panel for only a brief time, I redo the
calculations (column 4 of Table 6) on a smaller balanced panel. This produces similar
results. Such estimates indicate that the negative impacts of the centralization reforms
on life satisfaction are not persistent over time.
This does not mean that there is no effect of centralization reforms in the long run.
In particular, it must be borne in mind that there is a tradeoff in using life satisfaction.
This is an evaluative measure based on how people experience life, and therefore it may
suffer from biases related to this evaluation process. In particular, many writings in the
psychology literature highlight the ability of people to return quickly to a baseline level
of well-being despite the fact that some factor continues to operate. Thus, it may be
that the centralization reforms are unpopular in the short term, but because of a quick
adjustment (“the hedonic treadmill concept”) or a change in aspirations (“the aspiration
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treadmill concept”)18 centralization reforms appear to have only small effects on life satis-
faction in the long run. Some scholars such as Stutzer (2004), Layard (2005), Di Tella and
MacCulloch (2005), and Clark et al. (2008) have considered the economic implications of
this phenomenon of adaptation. In particular, Kahneman and Sugden (2005) argue that
it is important to take into account this bias in introducing subjective well-being to policy
making. Hence, the results may indicate that people are negatively affected by central-
ization reforms but that adaptation exists: The negative consequences of centralization
reforms on life satisfaction eventually wear off after three years.19
Table 6: The Dynamic Effects of Centralization Reforms on Individual Life satisfaction
Life satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline With controls More lags Balanced panel
Reform: 1 year prior -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0118 -0.0146
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0161)
Reform: year of implementation -0.0347** -0.0347** -0.0353** -0.0352**
(0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0164)
Reform: 1-2 years after -0.0369** -0.0372** -0.0379** -0.0285*
(0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0158) (0.0164)
Reform: 3 years after -0.00492 -0.0127
(0.0179) (0.0189)
Observations 84,218 84,218 84,218 76,534
R-squared 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
Nb of individuals 14,695 14,695 14,695 10,556
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal and cantonal controls No Yes Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by cantons. Individual controls include ln income, age, age squared,
marital status, employment status, and health status. Municipal controls include municipality size and cantonal controls
include cantonal GDP per capita and the cantonal unemployment rate. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
Overall, these results from the dynamic analysis indicate two clear effects: centraliza-
tion reforms decrease life satisfaction of approximately 3 percent of a standard deviation
for this sample. However, the negative impact decreases over time and is not significant
after three years.
18The hedonic treadmill, also known as hedonic adaptation, is the observed tendency of people to
return quickly to a relatively stable level of happiness despite major positive or negative events or life
changes (e.g., Brickman and Campbell (1971), Brickman et al. (1978), Diener and Fujita (2005), Diener
et al. (2006), Clark et al. (2008)). The aspiration treadmill implies that happy people are accustomed to
a pleasant life. Hence, happy people have higher aspirations (e.g., Kahneman and Krueger (2006)).
19This is commong findings in the happiness literature. Among others, Brickman et al. (1978) show
evidence of adaptation to income looking at lottery winners. Clark et al. (2008) suggest broadly complete
adaptation to marriage and divorce. Some work has also considered adaptation to disability. Oswald and
Powdthavee (2008)’s results reveal that about one-third to one-half of th negative impact of disability
on well-being dissipates over time.
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D. How Does Centralization Affect Individual Well-being? Some
Possible Channels
These findings raise questions about the channels via which centralization reforms
affect life satisfaction. One potential transmission channel is based on the fact that indi-
viduals are less satisfied with public spending because of implementation costs or because
public spending is less in accordance with their needs (Tiebout 1956, Oates 1972). The
magnitude of the effect of centralization reforms would depend on whether individuals
benefit from local public spending: The magnitude is likely to be higher for people with
bad health status, people with children attending school, and people receiving unem-
ployment benefits and social welfare payments. Because of this, satisfaction with public
spending, health satisfaction, and financial satisfaction may be expected to decrease.
However, there may be further explanations. For example, in addition to the govern-
ment performance explanation, centralization reforms may make individuals less satisfied
because they diminish their influence over the formulation of local policies. “People not
only care about outcomes; they also value the procedures that lead to the outcomes”
(Frey et al. 2004). The feeling of being involved and having political influence as well
as identity and self-determination can bring its share of satisfaction, particularly when
combined with direct democratic instruments. With centralization reforms, individuals
may feel restricted and tend to be less interested in political life. The link between po-
litical participation and happiness has been the subject of many empirical studies (Frey
and Stutzer 2000, 2002, 2005, Stutzer and Frey 2006, Dolan et al. 2008, Frey et al. 2008,
Inglehart 2009). It is possible to test for this hypothesis by using alternative subjective
outcomes such as “feeling about political influence,”“interest in politics,” and “satisfac-
tion with democracy.” Moreover, the effect of centralization reforms would depend on
the electoral status. Individuals who have the right to vote and to participate in po-
litical decision making should derive more satisfaction from political participation and
thus should be more affected by the centralization reforms. Note that this “procedural”
channel may be related to a “political match” explanation. It may be that municipal gov-
ernments are controlled by parties close to people’s preferred political standing but that
centralization reforms have transferred political, financial, and administrative powers to
cantonal governments that are controlled by parties further away.
D.1. Effects on Other Subjective Outcomes
To test for these underlying mechanisms, I examine the effects of centralization re-
forms by using alternative measures of satisfaction. Life satisfaction can be considered
as being composed of people’s satisfaction with various life domains such as health, fi-
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nancial situation, and political life. The SHP provides a range of satisfaction measures
with such domains on a 0–10 scale (see Appendix C.4.). I use these satisfaction measures
as outcome variables (Table 7) to understand which components of well-being drive the
relationship between life satisfaction and centralization reforms, though of course there
may be drivers of well-being not covered by these satisfaction questions.
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the effect of the reforms on health satisfaction. The
estimate is not statistically significant. The second specification tests the effect of the
reforms on financial situation in the household. There is no clear relationship between this
variable and the centralization reforms.20 In the third specification, I test for the effect
on satisfaction with public expenses. Interestingly, the effect is positive and significant
at the 11 percent level. Therefore, these results indicate that the centralization reforms
have not affected negatively people’s satisfaction with local policies.
Table 7: The Causal Effect of Centralization Reforms on Other Subjective Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health Financial Satisfaction Feeling Interest Satisfaction
Satisfaction Satisfaction with public about in politics with democracy
expenses political
influence
Centralization reforms -0.0171 -0.0225 0.0110 -0.215*** -0.137** 0.0225
(0.0159) (0.0336) (0.00673) (0.0794) (0.0534) (0.0499)
Observations 84,215 84,052 65,114 82,499 83,176 67,711
R-squared 0.155 0.024 0.005 0.018 0.018 0.008
Nb of individuals 14,701 14,681 13,720 13,989 14,407 13,899
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal and cantonal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by cantons. Individual controls include log income, age, age squared,
marital status, employment status and health status. Municipal controls include municipality size and cantonal controls
include cantonal GDP per capita and the cantonal unemployment rate. Specifications (4), (5), and (6) are OLS regressions
in which“centralization reforms” is interacted with electoral status. The regressions also include as controls the uninteracted
variables: “centralization reforms” and a variable equal to 1 if respondent is “on the electoral register”. Hence, I only report
the effect of centralization reforms for people who are on the electoral register.
This leaves the “procedural” explanation as the strongest candidate for the main re-
sults: Centralization reforms have decreased people’s life satisfaction because they dimin-
ish people’s influence over the formulation of local policies but not their satisfaction with
local policies per se. In specification (4), I look at the effect on people’s feeling about
political influence. This time, I do find that centralization reforms have a substantial
negative effect on feeling about political influence.21 People suffer from a lower ability
to influence political decisions after introduction of the reforms. I verify this intuition
20Note that the reforms needed to be financially neutral. However, the reforms may have benefited
certain municipalities and disadvantaged others. Here I focus on the average effect.
21I consider only the effect for people who are on the electoral register.
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in specifications (5) and (6) by using two alternative indicators: interest in politics and
satisfaction with democracy. The effect of centralization reforms on interest in politics
is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. However, note that the
effect on satisfaction with democracy is not significant. It may be that people are not
significantly dissatisfied with direct democracy but are less satisfied with the degree of
decentralization.
If centralization affects life satisfaction, it may be expected that one main transmission
channel would be via satisfaction with local policies. This does not seem to be the case—
at least in the short term. However, this does not mean that there is no economic effect
at all. Here, the effect of the reforms on satisfaction with public spending is slightly
positive. Moreover, the remainder of the effect might be delayed or biased downward by
preexisting cooperation at the canton level. However, it seems that the observed negative
effect of centralization reforms on life satisfaction is driven by a procedural effect, that
is, lower satisfaction with the political decision-making process itself.
D.2. Interaction Effects
Does the effect of centralization reforms on life satisfaction work through a range of
sociodemographic subgroups? Table 8 shows estimates where the variable “centralization
reforms” is interacted with a set of sociodemographic and political dummies. Remarkably,
there is no significant difference between gender, employment status, and income. In all
cases, the coefficients on centralization reforms are negative for each sociodemographic
subgroup, and the hypothesis that the effect is not the same across groups can be rejected
at the 10 percent level (except for students). This is consistent with previous findings
that show no detrimental effect on satisfaction with financial situation or satisfaction with
public expenses. However, note that the coefficient on students is significant at the 10
percent level. It may be that satisfaction at school has been affected, or it may be that
young people are plausibly more sensitive to such reforms that affect interest in politics
and propensity to be politically active (see Appendix Table A7).22
On a related issue, the question arises: Are people who are targeted by the reforms
more affected? I explore this for subgroups defined by health status, presence of children
in the household, and electoral status. Interestingly, the results show that there is no
significant difference for people in bad health and for people with children under 18 years
of age. These findings confirm that the effect of centralization reforms does not originate
from lower satisfaction with health or local public expenses. In addition, this is consistent
with what would be expected if satisfaction with public expenses was partly determined
22According to Appendix Table A.7, students are more interested in politics and have a higher sense
of being involved in political life.
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by the people who benefit from them. In contrast, if centralization reforms reduce people’s
feeling of having political influence, a stronger effect would be expected for those who
are on the electoral register. Fortunately, the SHP asks respondents about their electoral
status. Thus, specification (9) (Table 8) compares the effect of centralization reforms for
those who have political rights with those who do not.23 The regression shows that the
effect of centralization reforms is significantly stronger for those who are on the electoral
register. This is consistent with the previous findings that report a significant effect on
feeling about political influence and interest in politics.
I also test whether the effect of centralization reforms on life satisfaction varies by cul-
tural background, degree of direct democracy, municipality size, and political preferences.
A general assumption may be that people who are more prone to centralization would
be less affected by the reforms. However, the findings indicate that the effect is almost
identical for people with left-orientation and for those with right-orientation. Similarly,
the estimates show that the perception of the centralization reforms does not vary with
individual cultural background. Because there are three language regions in Switzerland,
here I consider three dichotomous variables: French-, Italian-, and German-speaking in-
dividuals. Specification (14) also shows that the effects of centralization reforms does not
differ with the degree of direct democracy. Interestingly, however, the effect of central-
ization reforms is significantly more negative for individuals living in small municipalities
(bottom 20 percent). Again this is consistent with the idea that the centralization reforms
have affected people’s feeling of having political influence and in particular for individuals
that have relatively high political influence with regard to their municipality size.
Another test involves comparing the effect of the reforms on well-being according
to how much the reforms have been debated. It may be suspected that the reforms
adopted with a low margin were less likely to have been expected and approved, even
if they were highly debated, and therefore should show a drop in well-being after their
approval—whereas the reforms approved with a high margin were adopted by“consensus,”
and therefore the approval should have generated a lower negative impact on the well-
being level. Specifications (16) and (17) show the estimates. Interestingly, I find that
centralization reforms approved with a low margin significantly decrease people’s life
satisfaction, whereas the total effect of reforms approved with a high margin is close to
zero.
Arguably, the results of neither Table 7 nor Table 8 rule out the possibility of a
“political match” effect. It may be that people are less satisfied after introduction of
the reforms because the municipal authority is not the same politically as the cantonal
majority to which they belong. Specification (18) adds an interaction term between
23On average, 84 percent of the respondents are on the electoral register in my sample.
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centralization reforms and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality and the canton
of residence have the same political majority. The estimate for this interaction term is
not significant. Therefore, this finding provides evidence that the results are not driven
by changes in political majority. In addition, specifications (19) and (20) test whether the
effect of centralization depends on whether the cantonal and municipal governments are
controlled by parties closer to and further away from people’s preferred political standing.
I add an interaction term between centralization reforms and a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if the canton (19) or the municipality (20) has a political majority close to
respondents’ political preferences. Similarly, the estimates show that the perception of
the centralization reforms does not vary with closely matched political preferences.
Finally, I test whether early-, middle-, and late-reforming cantons were differently af-
fected by the centralization reforms. It may be that respondents living in early-reforming
cantons were more sensitive to the reforms because they were the first to trial these in-
stitutional changes. Specifications (21), (22), and (23) report the coefficients. I find no
significant difference between the three groups.
Table 8: Centralization Reforms, Interaction effects, SHP
Dependent variable: Centralization
Life Satisfaction Reforms
Coeff. S.E. R-squared N. Obs N. id
(1) Women -0.0378 (0.0303) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(2) Bottom (25%) income -0.0367 (0.0330) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(3) Top (25%) income 0.0334 (0.0374) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(4) Retired -0.0879 (0.0515) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(5) Unemployed 0.156 (0.152) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(6) Student -0.0754* (0.0429) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(7) People in bad health -0.0500 (0.0404) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(8) People with children (under 18) 0.0306 (0.0261) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(9) On electoral register -0.0558* (0.0320) 0.035 84,218 14,695
(10) Political preference: left 0.0104 (0.0312) 0.034 73,068 13,548
(11) French -0.0599 (0.0476) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(12) German 0.0284 (0.0450) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(13) Italian 0.0698 (0.0801) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(14) Degree of direct democracy 0.0174 (0.0170) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(15) Bottom (20%) municipality size -0.0397** (0.0176) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(16) Reform approved with a low margin -0.0641* (0.0337) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(17) Reform approved with a high margin 0.0673* (0.0307) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(18) Same political majority between canton and municipality -0.0221 (0.0238) 0.033 70,571 11,817
(19) Canton political power close to people’s preferences -0.0123 (0.0529) 0.030 65,434 13,736
(20) Municipal political power close to people’s preferences -0.0923 (0.0939) 0.026 41,329 9,949
(21) Early reforming cantons 0.0487 (0.0301) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(22) Middle reforming cantons -0.0201 (0.0326) 0.034 84,218 14,695
(23) Late reforming cantons -0.0298 (0.0351) 0.034 84,218 14,695
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by cantons. Each specification is a single OLS regression in which
centralisation reforms is interacted with a set of dummies. All regressions include as controls the uninteracted set of dummy
variables as well as the same controls as the baseline regression. Individual controls include ln income, age, age squared,
marital status, employment status and health. Municipal controls include municipality size and cantonal controls include
cantonal income per capita and cantonal unemployment rate. In specification (16) and (17), cantons where the reforms
have been approved with a low margin are Neuchatel, Vaud and Zug and cantons where the reforms have been approved
with a high margin are Schwytz, Bern, Basel-Landschaft, Jura, Aargau, Thurgau, Appenzell Ausser Rhoden, Lucerne,
Schaffhausen, Uri, Basel-Stadt, Appenzell Inner Rhoden and Glarus.
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IV. Discussions
There has been a growing literature in subjective well-being that has attempted to
evaluate how changes in life circumstances may affect changes in well-being. Here, I
explore the importance of a change in municipal autonomy. The influence of local insti-
tutions on life satisfaction has until now been analyzed in cross-section. Here, I examine
how centralization reforms affect within-person change in life satisfaction over time. I
demonstrate using SHP data that the degree of decentralization does matter and that a
decrease in municipal autonomy is associated with a decrease in life satisfaction of ap-
proximately 3 percent of a standard deviation. I show that this negative effect on life
satisfaction is not persistent over time and disappears after three years—indicating the
capacity of people to adjust to such institutional changes. Moreover, I find that this
negative effect is driven by voters who report a feeling of losing political influence and
being less interested in politics. In contrast, satisfaction with public spending remains
the same or even slightly increases during the period of investigation.
This research has a number of implications. First, there are broad theoretical and
empirical implications for economic and well-being research. Economic variables such as
federal or local governments’ performance, level of public spending, and GDP per capita
are often viewed as proxies for well-being. Under the assumption that these economic
variables are main predictors of individual well-being, it is possible to use them to assess
the effect of centralization on well-being. However, empirical evidence has shown that
economic factors are statistically significantly but weakly correlated with life satisfaction.
Other factors such as trust, social relationship, and civic participation matter. This
paper suggests that, to assess the overall effects of centralization, more than government
performance must be looked at. Local identity and a sense of self-determination may act
in part as an additional component that explains why centralization reforms negatively
affect individual life satisfaction.
Second, this paper adds to the literature that uses life satisfaction to evaluate the
effects of policy changes. Measures of subjective well-being are often used to identify dif-
ferent determinants of quality of life (e.g., financial situation, health, work, family, social
relationship, and civic engagement). However, for policy makers, the goal is to understand
how these different determinants can be modulated such that they are more conducive for
the cultivation of people’s well-being. This paper suggests a way to use life satisfaction
data to evaluate how policy reforms can change people’s well-being. Nonetheless, some
issues remain unresolved. For example, it must be borne in mind that life satisfaction is
an evaluative measure and therefore has some drawbacks.
This study has several limitations. One concern is that the results discussed so far
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may depend on an event effect and not on the centralization reforms themselves. People
tend to have a preference for the current state of affairs. Thus, when reporting life
satisfaction, the current baseline of centralization (or status quo) is taken as a reference
point, and any change from that baseline is perceived as a loss. Experimental evidence for
the detection of status quo bias and resistance to change has often used reversal tests. Let
us consider a change in the degree of centralization in the opposite direction (increase in
local autonomy). If this also has negative effects on life satisfaction, then there is reason
to suspect that individuals suffer from status quo bias. Although it is not possible to test
for this hypothesis using the same quasi-natural experiment, it can be estimated whether
more risk-averse people (who tend to be more reluctant to changes) are more affected by
centralization reforms. The SHP provides information on risk attitude on a 0–10 scale,
from “avoid taking risks” to “fully prepared to take risks.” I define risk-averse people as
people answering from 0 to 5. Appendix Table A.10 reports the results: I find that being
risk averse does not lead to a statistically significant higher drop in life satisfaction after
implementation of the reforms.
A second limitation of the study is that the use of subjective well-being as a measure
of individual well-being may be open to objection. One concern may be the possibility
that the results would be driven by respondents’ changes in how they define their satis-
faction, rather than true changes in their underlying satisfaction. They may use different
standards of evaluation about what counts as being satisfied over time. One possible
objection is that in this data there is a two years lasting negative effect from implementa-
tion of the centralization reforms; this seems inconsistent with the idea that respondents
rescale their definition of life satisfaction at least in the short term. Alternatively, redoing
the main results by using a measure of optimism and a measure of anxiety taken from
the SHP also shows negative effects of the centralization reforms on individuals’ opti-
mism and positive effects on individuals’ anxiety. The effect on individuals’ optimism is
significant at the 12 percent level (see Appendix Table A.10).
On a related issue, it is possible to test whether individuals change their behavior
according to the change in life satisfaction. I look at whether voter turnout has increased
after implementation of the reforms. I use administrative data from the Swiss Federal
Statistics that provide information on voter participation at federal and cantonal elections
between 1999 and 2011 (Appendix Tables A.11 and A.12). The figures show that voter
participation in the federal elections at the canton level before and after the reforms
shifted downward by 3 percentage points in cantons that implemented a centralization
reform. Although it would be an overstatement to say that the centralization reforms are
in part responsible for the decrease in voter participation at the federal level in the last
decade in Switzerland, they have certainly played a role in diminishing people’s interest
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in politics. Moreover, it is worth noting that voter participation in cantonal elections has
not significantly increased since implementation of the reforms.
V. Conclusion
This paper analyzes whether people care about the degree of decentralization. I
take advantage of a wave of reforms taking place in Switzerland, where 19 out of the
26 cantons have changed the distribution of tasks between cantons and municipalities
during the last decade. I find that people experience a significant fall in life satisfaction
immediately after introduction of the reforms, although the effect vanishes over time. By
looking at alternative outcome measures and decomposing by subgroups, I find that the
negative effect can be attributed to a feeling of losing political influence. This indicates
that participation and self-determination play a key role in determining the perception of
centralization reforms. These findings have implications that are valid for the subjective
well-being literature and the political economy literature.
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B. Appendix Tables
Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics: Cantons, SHP
Cantons No. of No. of No. of Obs. Avg. Obs.
Municipalities Municipalities Per Canton Per Municipality
2012 (Sample - 2012) (Sample) (Sample)
Zurich 171 135 14,464 743
Bern 382 167 10,556 165
Luzern 87 58 4,546 211
Uri 20 7 230 49
Schwyz 30 23 1,423 75
Obwalden 7 6 448 78
Nidwalden 11 9 414 46
Glarus 3 4 439 28
Zug 11 9 984 129
Fribourg 165 65 3,222 188
Solothurn 120 52 2,959 84
Basel-Stadt 3 3 1,689 795
Basel-Landschaft 76 51 3,006 117
Schaffhausen 27 12 768 159
Appenzell Ausserhoden 20 11 681 84
Appenzell Innerrhoden 6 3 95 37
St. Gallen 85 71 4,644 184
Graubunden 176 48 1,715 49
Aargau 219 129 7,436 67
Thurgau 80 50 1,919 59
Ticino 157 70 3,101 57
Vaud 326 136 8,311 225
Valais 141 51 2,849 104
Neuchatel 53 38 4,465 367
Geneva 45 30 3,670 413
Jura 64 12 184 12
Total 2,485 1,250 84,218 279
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show respectively the number of municipalities per canton in 2012 and the number of municipalities
for which data is available (sample: 2012). Columns 3 and 4 present the average number of observations per canton and
per municipalities in my sample.
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Table A.7: Predictors of Satisfaction by Domains. SHP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Health Satisfaction Satisfaction Feeling about Interest in Satisfaction
satisfaction with financial with public political politics with
situation expenses influence democracy
Ln yearly total personal income 0.0448*** 0.671*** 0.0176*** 0.118*** 0.233*** 0.149***
(0.0123) (0.0222) (0.00465) (0.0271) (0.0319) (0.0210)
Female 0.0126 0.135*** -0.0375*** -0.0190 -0.813*** -0.138***
(0.0206) (0.0223) (0.00803) (0.0381) (0.0457) (0.0250)
Age -0.0382*** -0.0244*** 0.00450** 0.0514*** 0.0934*** -0.0135**
(0.00630) (0.00707) (0.00177) (0.00926) (0.00721) (0.00577)
Age2/1000 0.329*** 0.470*** -0.0165 -0.607*** -0.519*** 0.166**
(0.0606) (0.0648) (0.0172) (0.104) (0.0746) (0.0630)
Single -0.0945*** -0.111** -0.00588 0.0698 0.0618 -0.0590
(0.0302) (0.0411) (0.0103) (0.0537) (0.0609) (0.0517)
Bad health -2.558*** -0.554*** -0.0357*** -0.222*** -0.138*** -0.355***
(0.0602) (0.0359) (0.00560) (0.0486) (0.0277) (0.0333)
Widowed 0.0357 -0.314*** -0.00413 -0.210* -0.184 -0.190
(0.0455) (0.0947) (0.0200) (0.112) (0.141) (0.119)
Separated -0.00669 -1.096*** -0.0146 0.0879 -0.245* -0.154*
(0.0810) (0.124) (0.0231) (0.138) (0.138) (0.0864)
Divorced -0.138*** -0.661*** -0.0463*** -0.315*** -0.431*** -0.355***
(0.0383) (0.0527) (0.0115) (0.0716) (0.0706) (0.0523)
Unemployed -0.268*** -1.224*** -0.0587** -0.0304 0.0420 -0.390***
(0.0748) (0.104) (0.0241) (0.0967) (0.110) (0.0978)
Housewife 0.0171 0.248*** 0.0200* 0.126** 0.0591 0.118**
(0.0355) (0.0445) (0.0116) (0.0566) (0.0578) (0.0518)
Student -0.0257 0.530*** 0.0394** 0.293*** 1.092*** 0.534***
(0.0416) (0.0800) (0.0178) (0.0534) (0.0671) (0.0559)
Retired -0.159*** 0.0769 0.00862 -0.00636 0.0591 0.0257
(0.0462) (0.0672) (0.0113) (0.114) (0.0857) (0.0625)
Left -0.0847*** -0.0487 -0.0849*** 0.186*** 0.629*** 0.124**
(0.0184) (0.0358) (0.00999) (0.0175) (0.0287) (0.0556)
Middle education 0.101*** 0.192*** 0.0178** 0.365*** 0.578*** 0.254***
(0.0265) (0.0491) (0.00863) (0.0454) (0.0497) (0.0545)
High education 0.123*** 0.490*** 0.0728*** 0.582*** 1.265*** 0.571***
(0.0344) (0.0653) (0.0124) (0.0445) (0.0535) (0.0499)
Foreigner -0.142*** -0.457*** -0.0526*** -1.534*** -0.642*** 0.275***
(0.0501) (0.0556) (0.0145) (0.114) (0.0682) (0.0517)
Catholic 0.0400 0.0312 0.0117 0.130*** -0.158** 0.262***
(0.0353) (0.0390) (0.00980) (0.0439) (0.0739) (0.0708)
Protestant 0.0198 0.0785 0.0374*** 0.151*** -0.0161 0.292***
(0.0331) (0.0545) (0.0113) (0.0535) (0.102) (0.0663)
Other religion -0.00911 -0.136 0.0168 0.329*** -0.140 0.463***
(0.0644) (0.107) (0.0143) (0.0906) (0.143) (0.0785)
French -0.0751 -0.316*** -0.222*** -0.597*** -0.496*** -0.365***
(0.0689) (0.0817) (0.0142) (0.112) (0.0967) (0.0900)
Italian -0.0627 -0.302 -0.143*** -0.625*** -1.336*** -0.484***
(0.142) (0.282) (0.0238) (0.107) (0.316) (0.0911)
Constant 10.81*** -2.890 -0.813 2.104 2.143 6.963**
(3.019) (2.696) (0.602) (4.474) (3.251) (3.324)
Observations 59,649 59,526 52,016 59,340 59,647 53,800
R-squared 0.304 0.144 0.078 0.067 0.170 0.060
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by cantons. All regressions include individual controls, municipal
and cantonal controls, canton fixed effects, canton time trends and year fixed effects. These regressions are estimated in
cross-section, without individual fixed effects. Municipal and cantonal controls include municipality size, cantonal income
per capita and cantonal unemployment rate. ***,**,** significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table A.9: The Causal Effect of Centralization Reforms on Life satisfaction. Detailed
Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cross-section Cross-section Panel analysis Panel analysis
without controls with controls without controls with controls
Centralization reforms -0.0458** -0.0458** -0.0411** -0.0383**
(0.0204) (0.0194) (0.0170) (0.0169)
Individual controls
Ln yearly total personal income 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.0629*** 0.0630***
(0.0237) (0.0241) (0.00921) (0.00922)
Female 0.133*** 0.134*** – –
(0.0275) (0.0276)
Age -0.0426*** -0.0427*** -0.0634*** -0.0660***
(0.00644) (0.00643) (0.00780) (0.00707)
Age2/1000 0.493*** 0.495*** 0.417*** 0.416***
(0.0551) (0.0551) (0.0687) (0.0685)
Single -0.338*** -0.334*** -0.227*** -0.228***
(0.0472) (0.0474) (0.0382) (0.0392)
Bad health -0.993*** -0.992*** -0.400*** -0.400***
(0.0505) (0.0504) (0.0160) (0.0160)
Widowed -0.437*** -0.434*** -0.589*** -0.589***
(0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0805) (0.0805)
Separated -0.818*** -0.817*** -0.549*** -0.548***
(0.112) (0.111) (0.0573) (0.0566)
Divorced -0.483*** -0.480*** -0.0851* -0.0849**
(0.0677) (0.0671) (0.0420) (0.0410)
Unemployed -1.060*** -1.058*** -0.560*** -0.560***
(0.184) (0.184) (0.0636) (0.0632)
Housewife 0.144*** 0.143*** -0.0276 -0.0273
(0.0501) (0.0502) (0.0300) (0.0302)
Student 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.0588* 0.0597**
(0.0656) (0.0652) (0.0299) (0.0289)
Retired 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.0458* 0.0460*
(0.0516) (0.0517) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Left -0.0952*** -0.0920*** – –
(0.0307) (0.0291)
Middle education 0.0853 0.0863 – –
(0.0528) (0.0523)
High education 0.103* 0.106* – –
(0.0603) (0.0592)
Foreigner -0.162** -0.159** – –
(0.0680) (0.0693)
Catholic 0.0174 0.0176 – –
(0.0257) (0.0259)
Protestant 0.0788** 0.0771** – –
(0.0284) (0.0289)
Other religion 0.0250 0.0260 – –
(0.0843) (0.0835)
French -0.182*** -0.181*** – –
(0.0565) (0.0561)
Italian -0.341* -0.337* – –
(0.195) (0.196)
Municipal and cantonal controls
Ln cantonal income per capita 0.214 0.233
(0.153) (0.154)
Cantonal unemployment rate -0.0285 0.0226
(0.0382) (0.0153)
Ln municipal population -0.0108 0.00217
(0.00943) (0.0154)
Observations 54,761 54,761 84,218 84,218
R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.034 0.034
Nb of Individuals 10,842 10,842 14,695 14,695
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by cantons. All regressions include individual controls, municipal and
cantonal controls, individual fixed effects, canton fixed effects, year fixed effects and canton time trends. *,**,*** significant
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A.10: Additional Tests
(1) (2) (3)
Risk averse Optimism Anxiety
Centralization reforms -0.0194 -0.0534 0.0215
(0.0169) (0.0334) (0.0306)
Observations 73,068 84,122 84,200
R-squared 0.033 0.025 0.028
Nb of individuals 13,548 14,693 14,697
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Municipal and cantonal controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Canton specific time trends Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by cantons. Individual controls include ln income, age, age squared,
marital status, employment status and health status. Municipal controls include municipality size and cantonal controls
include cantonal GDP per capita and the cantonal unemployment rate. In column (1), I only report the interaction term
between “risk averse” and “Centralization reforms”. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Table A.11: Impact of the Reforms on Voter Participation at the Federal Votations
Before Reform After Reform Change (S.E.)
Voter participation 48.57 (0.94) 45.57 (0.84) - 3.00*** (1.28)
Notes: Based on 19 cantons from 2001 to 2009. Data are from the Swiss Federal Statis-
tics. In parentheses, standard deviations in columns 1 and 2 and standard errors in
column 3.
Table A.12: Impact of the Reforms on Voter Participation at the Cantonal Elections
Before Reform After Reform Change (S.E.)
Voter participation 46.35 (1.65) 48.02 (0.85) 1.673 (1.99)
Notes: Based on 19 cantons from 1999 to 2011. Data are from the Swiss Federal Statis-
tics. In parentheses, standard deviations in columns 1 and 2 and standard errors in
column 3.
C. Appendix: Variables Definitions
C.1. The Federal Population Census
The Federal Population Census is realised every 10 years and provides data on the
demographic, spatial, social and economic developments of Switzerland: http://www.bfs.
admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/infothek/erhebungen__quellen/blank/blank/vz/uebersicht.html
I rely on the following variables from the Federal Population Census:
• Age composition
• % women
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• % married
• % foreigner
• % Christian; % Muslim; % Jewish; %no religion
• % French; % German; %Italian
• % employed; % unemployed
• % primary education; % secondary education; % tertiary education
C.2. The BADAC
The BADAC website provides unique data from administrative sources on the Swiss
Federation, its political-administrative organisation, its cantonal and municipal public
services: http://www.badac.ch/fr/index.php.
I rely on the following variables from the BADAC data:
• Cantonal GDP per capita: http://www.badac.ch/db/db.php?abs=canton_x&code=Csi9.11a2MATIC&annee=
max&arg=&lang=Fr
• Cantonal Unemployment rate: http://www.badac.ch/db/db.php?abs=canton_x&code=Csi11.51&annee=
max&arg=&lang=Fr
• Cantonal Public Spending (total) per capita: http://www.badac.ch/db/db.php?abs=canton_
x&code=Csi10.41bMATIC&annee=max&arg=&lang=Fr
• Municipality Size: http://www.badac.ch/db/db.php?abs=region5_1&code=Vs11.11&annee=max&arg=&lang=
Fr
• Degree of Local Decentralization: http://www.badac.ch/db/db.php?abs=canton_x&code=Csi10.41dMATIC&annee=
max&arg=&lang=Fr
C.3. Direct Democracy
Direct Democracy is an index computed by Stutzer (1999). This index describes
institutions of direct democracy in 26 Swiss cantons, specifically the statutory initiative
and referendum, the constitutional initiative, and the fiscal referendum.
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C.4. Swiss Household Panel
I rely on the following questions from the SHP:
• Satisfaction with life in general: In general, how satisfied are you with you life if 0
means “not at all satisfied” and 10 means “completely satisfied”?
• Frequency of energy and optimism: Are you often plenty of strength, energy and
optimism, if 0 means “never” and 10 “always”?
• Depression, blues, anxiety: Frequency. Do you often have negative feelings such as
having the blues, being desperate, suffering from anxiety or depression, if 0 means
“never” and 10 “always”?
• Feeling about political influence: How much influence do you think someone like
you can have on government policy, if 0 means “no influence” and 10 “a very strong
influence”?
• Interest in politics: Let’s now talk about politics and of your opinions on the subject.
Generally, how interested are you in politics if 0 means “not at all interested” and
10 “very interested”.
• Satisfaction with health status: How satisfied are you with your state of health, if
0 means “not at all satisfied” and 10 “completely satisfied”?
• Satisfaction with financial situation in the household: We would now like to talk
about your financial situation. Overall how satisfied are you with the financial
situation of your household, if 0 means “not at all satisfied” and 10 “completely
satisfied”?
• Overall satisfaction with democracy: Overall how satisfied are you with the way
in which democracy works in our country, if 0 means “not at all satisfied” and 10
“completely satisfied”?
• Satisfaction with public expenses: Are you in favour of a diminution or in favour of
an increase of the Confederation social spendings?
• Risk attitude: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risk or do
you try to avoid taking risks, if 0 means “avoid taking risks” and 10 means “fully
prepared to take risk”?
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